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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

;

Plaintiff and Appellee,

]
)

Appellate Case No. 990565-CA

V.

)
LAWRENCE MARSHALL JACKSON, ]
Defendant and Appellant.

Priority No. 2

)

REPLY OF THE APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment
Eighth District Court
Uintah County, State of Utah
Honorable John R. Anderson, Judge

Appellee's Statement of the Facts Challenged
Appellee's lengthy and emotionally charged statement of the facts, Br. Appellee
4-8, should not obscure the issues that Jackson has presented on appeal. Jackson never
has contested the fact that he pleaded guilty to one count of rape of a child. He never
has sought reversal of his ensuing conviction. Instead, he has argued that in the
sentencing phase of his case the trial court made two errors and trial counsel rendered
1

constitutionally deficient performance. The two errors complained of are that the trial
court committed plain error by failing to make detailed factual findings on the record
supporting imposition of the upper term of fifteen years to life imprisonment, as Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 requires, and it abused its discretion by failing to conduct specific
inquiry and appoint substitute counsel at sentencing despite written and verbal
complaints and an express request for new counsel. The ineffective assistance
complained of is that counsel failed to bring § 76-3-201 to the court's attention and
ensure compliance with the statute. Jackson is entitled to dispassionate review of these
issues, independent of the particulars of the offense of rape of a child.
Further, appellee's references to Jackson's diagnostic report, mental health
evaluation, and presentence investigation report, insofar as they may justify imposition of
the upper minimum mandatory term, are misplaced. If in fact they contain observations,
impressions, or recommendations supporting the sentence that Jackson received, it was
incumbent upon the trial court to make them explicit at sentencing and explain how they
influenced the decision ultimately reached. The court failed to do this, and appellee
should not try now, even implicitly. The required findings of fact may not be inferred
from the reports. They may not be incorporated by reference. They must independently
and clearly be made part of the record at the time of sentencing. See State v. BeltranFelix, 922 P.2d 30, 37 (Utah Ct.App. 1996); see also State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114,
1117(UtahCt.App. 1990).
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Insufficiency of Findings in Support of Sentence
Jackson agrees with appellee, Br. Appellee 8-10, that his claim of insufficient
findings in support of sentence should be reviewed under the plain error doctrine and
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 is controlling. According to § 76-3-201,
(6)(a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of
three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of
the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or
mitigation of the crime.

(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for
imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines
regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999).
Jackson, however, does dispute appellee's claim, Br. Appellee 10-11, that Utah
case law supports the proposition that trial courts need not make specificfindingsor
make use of sentencing guidelines when choosing among alternative minimum mandatory
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sentences.1 Cases that appellee cites are inapposite and contrary to appellee's position.
•In State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,1120-22 (Utah Ct.App. 1995), defendant
challenged imposition of the middle not upper term. The case therefore is
distinguishable. In any event, the trial court reviewed, on the record, aggravating and
mitigating evidence, even though not required to do so statutorily.
•In State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1136-37 (Utah 1989), defendant challenged
imposition of the middle not upper term. The case is distinguishable. Also, the trial
court reviewed, on the record, aggravating and mitigating evidence, even though not
required to do so statutorily.
•In State v. Bell 754 P.2d 55, 57-60 (Utah 1988), defendant challenged
imposition of middle not upper terms. The case is distinguishable. And, again, the trial
court reviewed, on the record, aggravating and mitigating evidence, even though not
required to do so statutorily.
•In State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244-45 (Utah 1995), the issue was not the
application of sentencing guidelines but whether the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing upper terms. There was no abuse because the court identified, on the record,
numerous aggravating circumstances.

Contrary to appellee's claim, Jackson never has asserted that when sentencing
defendants under § 76-3-201 trial courts must consider only those mitigating and
aggravating circumstances in the sentencing guidelines or that they must discuss
mechanically, one by one, all the circumstances identified. Appellee's arguments in this
regard are specious.
4

•In State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 191-93 (Utah 1990), the trial court properly
imposed upper terms because it identified, on the record, sufficient aggravating
circumstances.
•In State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App 190,fflf18-21, 5 P.3d 1228, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in imposing the upper term because it identified, on the
record, five aggravating circumstances and only one mitigating circumstance.
Remarkably, in summarizing these cases, appellee claims that there is no
requirement that trial courts actively must make use of the sentencing guidelines in
imposing sentences under § 76-3-201. If in fact this is true, appellee would appear to
invite the Court of Appeals to interpret the statute and determine to what extent, if any,
the guidelines should play a part in courts' decision-making. Jackson himself believes
that the language contained in subsection (6)(e) is both plain and controlling: "In
determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding
aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission."
The language here is not permissive; it does not say that trial courts "may" or "may not"
use the guidelines. The language is not hortatory; it does not say that courts "should"
use the guidelines. Rather, the language is mandatory; it says, unequivocally, that courts
"shall" use them.
Appellee implicitly recognizes this statutory construction when averring, Br.
Appellee 11-12, that the trial court actually considered the guidelines' factors in
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reaching its sentencing decision in Jackson's case. The court, however, did no such
thing. Alternatively, assuming for the sake of argument that the court used the
guidelines, it still did not make use of them in a manner justifying imposition of the upper
term.
As appellee concedes, the trial court did not expressly refer to the sentencing
guidelines prior to imposing sentence. Indeed the court never acknowledged the
existence of the guidelines by name, the purpose of the guidelines in sentencing
proceedings generally, or the application of any of the identified aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in this specific case. Arguably, any overlap between the court's
remarks at sentencing and the contents of the guidelines is insignificant and the product
of chance rather than design. In the alternative, comments that the court made about
Jackson, even when bootstrapped to the language of the guidelines, do not explain why it
was appropriate for him to have been sentenced to the upper term. Two mitigating
circumstances are not present: existence of developmental disabilities and
appropriateness for rehabilitative treatment. One mitigating circumstances is present: no
significant criminal history for a period often years. But where are there aggravating
circumstances? The court identified none. The court labeled Jackson "a pedophile," as
appellee emphasizes, but that is not an aggravating circumstance in this case. Rape of a
child is, by definition, an act of pedophilia. Separate and distinct aggravating
circumstances are required for the court to impose the upper term. See State v. Russell,

6

791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990); see also State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 560 (Utah
1987). Further, despite appellee's claim, the court's ^reason" for its sentencing decision,
that "it was necessary to protect society and punish defendant," is really no reason at all
or perhaps more properly speaking not a legally sufficient reason, in this case, to impose
the upper term. Courts protect society and punish defendants every day, in all types of
cases, ranging from minor traffic offenses to murder. The general rationale of protection
and punishment does not provide a proper basis for the particular sentence, among three
possible sentences, that Jackson received.
Bottom line, the trial committed plain error by failing to make detailed factual
findings on the record supporting imposition of the upper term of fifteen years to life
imprisonment, as Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 requires.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing
Appellee asserts, Br. Appellee 13-14, that assigned counsel did not render
constitutionally deficient performance by failing to bring the requirements of § 76-3-201
to the trial court's attention because the court in fact made findings sufficient to support
its sentencing decision. As discussed above, however, the court did not make detailed
factual findings on the record supporting imposition of the upper term.
Jackson continues to believe that reasonable professional assistance, at sentencing,
encompasses ensuring compliance with § 76-3-201 when the statute is applicable. Such
assistance is especially critical when, as here, the trial court neglected to carry out the
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statutorily required scrutiny and analysis and the prosecutor said and did nothing to
assist the court in this regard. In these circumstances, it is trial counsel who is
defendant's lifeline and last hope and bears special responsibility for guaranteeing fair
hearing, due process, adequacy of the record, and confidence in the proceedings upon
appellate review.
Failure to Conduct Specific Inquiry and Appoint Substitute Counsel
Appellee claims, Br. Appellee 16, that the trial court's inquiry into Jackson's
complaints against assigned counsel was sufficient to conclude that there was no need to
appoint substitute counsel. This assertion is not supported by a fair and objective reading
of the transcript of the sentencing hearing. See Br. Appellant, Addendum B. The court's
inquiry lasted but a minute or two. Id. at 3-5. The court allowed Jackson, then his
counsel, to speak, but it did not ask either even one question based on what was said.
Further, the reason articulated by the court for deciding not to appoint substitute
counsel—"Well, not hearing from counsel in terms of a failure to be able to work you.
I'm going to keep her on the case at this point and deny your motion."—bears no
connection to the proper legal standard to be used in such circumstances. It is not
counsel's perceived unhappiness or difficulty working with a defendant that determines
whether substitute counsel is legally required. Instead, it is the nature of the relationship
between counsel and a defendant that is determinative, in particular whether there has
been a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict. State v.
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Lovelh 1999 UT 40,1f3l, 984 P.2d 382, cert denied, 528 U.S. 1083 (2000).
Jackson does not suggest that, when confronted with complaints about assigned
counsel, a trial court must go through a checklist and ask a defendant and counsel certain
questions in a certain order. Some questioning, however, is almost always indicated.
Here, despite Jackson's letter to the court, as well as his comments at the beginning of
the sentencing hearing, the court asked no specific questions in response to the
complaints made. Arguably, the court might have inquired into the basis for Jackson's
belief that counsel was "not interested in protecting my interest," the opportunity that
Jackson and counsel did or did not have to prepare for the hearing, and whether in fact
counsel was ready to go forward with the issue at hand at that time, namely the
appropriate sentence to be imposed upon Jackson under § 76-3-201. There is every
indication that had such questioning occurred the court would have found evidence of a
complete breakdown of communication, to the point where Jackson was not receiving
adequate representation.
This argument is not purely speculative but is supported by what actually
occurred at sentencing. Most significantly, assigned counsel never brought the
requirements of § 76-2-301 to the court's attention. But she also never used the statute,
with its attendant guidelines, to present mitigating evidence and challenge putative
aggravating evidence. True, she was not totally passive. As appellee points out, Br.
Appellee 17, counsel brought up the matter of Jackson's request for substitute counsel,
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explained why she had been unable to communicate with him before the hearing, and
expanded on his complaints about the way in which he was treated during diagnostic and
presentence evaluation. These matters, however, were essentially irrelevant to the
proceedings, which were being held for the purpose of deciding which sentence, among
alternative minimum mandatory sentences, Jackson should receive. Contrary to
appellee's claim, counsel was not properly focused on and did not vigorously represent
Jackson's interests at sentencing. This case is clearly distinguishable from Lovell, supra,
and State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct.App. 1987), where there was adequate
representation.
Jackson's instincts about the adequacy of assigned counsel at sentencing proved to
be correct. If the trial court had conducted specific inquiry, as required, it likely would
have discovered sufficient grounds to appoint substitute counsel. And if there had been
substitute counsel, Jackson likely would have been represented by counsel who, at the
very least, recognized the import of § 76-3-201, made sure that the court complied with
the statute, and zealously used it to advocate for Jackson and safeguard his numerous
interests at the time of sentencing.
Relief Sought
This Court should hold that (1) the trial court committed plain error by failing to
make detailed factual findings on the record supporting imposition of the upper term of
fifteen years to life imprisonment, as Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 requires; (2) trial

10

counsel was ineffective because she failed to bring the requirements of § 76-3-201 to the
court's attention and ensure compliance with the statute; and (3) the court abused its
discretion by failing to conduct specific inquiry and appoint substitute counsel at
sentencing. Consequently, the Court should vacate Jackson's sentence and remand the
case to the trial court for another sentencing hearing to be conducted de novo with newly
appointed defense counsel.
Oral Argument and Published Opinion Requested
Jackson, through appellate counsel, requests oral argument before the Court.
Further, Jackson requests a published opinion. The issues that he has raised on appeal
involve the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 and the roles and
responsibilities of all parties in ensuring that the statute is applied properly. A published
opinion will help promote the fair and effective administration of justice in future
sentencing hearings where, as here, trial courts must choose from alternative minimum
mandatory terms and clearly state the reasons for their choice on the record and both
prosecutors and defense counsel actively must be part of this process.
DATED this

|D

day of January, 2001.

W^MT^-v
WESLEY M.BADEN
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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